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The institutional landscape of local dispute resolution 
in Bangladesh is rich: it includes the traditional process 
of shalish, longstanding and impressive civil society 
efforts to improve on shalish, and a somewhat less-
explored provision for gram adalat or village courts. 
Based on a nationally representative survey, qualitative 
evidence from focus groups, and a telephone survey 
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of 40 Union Parishad chairpersons (a little less than 1 
percent of the total Union Parishads), it provides both 
an empirical mapping of local conflict and justice and 
pointers to possible policy reforms. It suggests a number 
of opportunities for strengthening local justice and argues 
that the village courts may pose a useful bridge between 
Bangladesh’s informal and formal justice institutions. 
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Introduction 
 
Local justice lies at the intersection of two of the most forceful currents in Bangladesh.  One of 
these is the rule of law: the government‘s highest aspiration is to establish law - and not 
personality or power -as the fundamental structure in which electoral competition will once again 
take place.   
 
A second force that defines the present social and political moment is decentralization. 
Bangladesh has deepened its commitment to endow local communities with a greater share of the 
responsibilities of governing and this is visible most recently in the Sixth Five Year Plan.  One 
premise of this shift in sharing power is that people are more capable of participating in and 
holding accountable the government that is within reach. 
 
Where these two currents meet is the question of what the rule of law should look like at the 
local level.  How can Bangladesh ensure that principles of justice, and not the forces of 
personality or power, comprise the frame within which local self-governance takes place?  The 
institutional landscape of Bangladeshi local justice is rich: it includes the traditional process of 
shalish
2
, longstanding and impressive civil society efforts to improve on shalish, and a somewhat 
less-explored provision for gram adalat or village courts.  How should these institutions evolve, 
and how can they grow stronger, in light of the broader changes shaping Bangladeshi society? 
 
This paper aims to provide a foundation for dialogue on those questions.  The paper has two 
parts.  First, we will map the landscape of local justice institutions, discussing what we know 
about the functioning of each institution, and about how the various institutions interrelate.  We 
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2
 Described in greater detail later in the paper, the shalish is the traditional informal dispute resolution system that 
has historically been in existence.  NGOs have worked to ―reform‖ this shalish which has come under criticism for 
its elitist and unfair character and we refer to this as the ―NGO reformed shalish‖ without taking away from the 
importance of the traditional mechanism.  Finally by an Act of 1976 the government set up village courts or ―gram 
adalats‖ at the local level.  We use the terms ―gram adalat‖ and ―village court‖ interchangeably in this paper. 
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will draw on existing literature and also present data from our own research.  Second, we will 
discuss the policy choices and possibilities for reform posed by this landscape.   
Methodology 
 
This paper has several sources of data.  The World Bank Gender Norms Survey
3
 (WBGNS) is a 
nationally representative survey of 3,000 women from two age-groups – 15-25 year olds and 45-
60 year olds.  In addition, it also surveyed 1,500 male heads of households and 500 community 
leaders like Union Parishad members, religious leaders, teachers and businessmen.  Among other 
questions, the survey had a few on conflict in the community and many more on spousal and 
other forms of violence against women.  The survey also asked if in the last year the respondent 
had heard of certain criminal incidents in the community or acts of violence against anyone in 
their community (village or urban neighborhood).  To our knowledge this is the first nationally 
representative survey on conflict despite the fact that the number of questions is few.  It is also 
the only survey that asks questions about spousal violence of both men and women. 
 
A companion qualitative field study was also conducted in 2006 in tandem with the WBGNS.  
Thirty-two focus groups of on average 7 participants each were conducted at the ward level in 
the districts of Dinajpur, Satkhira, Sunamgonj and Mymensingh.  The distribution of focus 
groups was as follows:  four each with adolescent boys and girls (separately) in school, four each 
with adolescent boys and girls (separately) out of school, four each with mothers of adolescent 
girls from poor backgrounds, four each with mothers of adolescent girls from elite/rich 
backgrounds, four each with fathers of adolescent girls from poor backgrounds, four each with 
fathers of adolescent girls from elite/rich backgrounds. The questions were on changes in the 
community, changes in the lives of girls due to education, marriage practices, access to justice, 
participation in political processes, aspirations of young men and women and select gender 
norms. The qualitative field study also asked for shalish ―stories‖ – descriptions of shalish the 
respondents had attended or knew about and their level of satisfaction with the outcome and 
process.  In all, there are twenty usable ―stories‖ whose content was analyzed for this paper. 
 
Finally, we administered a telephone survey to 40 UP chairpersons (a little less than 1 percent of 
the total UPs) to inquire about whether and how they operated village courts, their knowledge of 
the Village Courts Act, their understanding of the difference between village courts and other 
kinds of dispute resolution and their thoughts about improving local justice.   
I.  NATURE OF CONFLICT AND DISPUTES 
 
The WBGNS 2006 has questions on level of perceived conflict in the community and knowledge 
of criminal acts that have occurred in the last year.  It has more detailed questions on spousal 
violence.  This section lays out the results from those questions and despite the fact that 
measuring level of conflict is difficult as we point out later, we do believe that the data give us 
insight into regional variations and types of conflict that local justice providers have to deal with. 
 
Overall the WBGNS 2006 finds a very high perception of harmony in the community.  Less than 
10 percent of any category of respondents believed that people ―fight a lot‖ in their village or 
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 See annex 1 for details 
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neighborhood (Figure 1).  These results corroborate the idea that not only perceptions of criminal 
incidents but also actual knowledge of members of the community having been victimized is 
very low.  These results are almost exactly corroborated by all 32 focus groups held in different 
parts of the country.  Interestingly, the incidence of politically motivated violence seems to be 
higher especially in urban areas.   
 
Figure 1: Bangladesh:  Very high perception of harmony in the community
Source:  World Bank Gender Norms Survey 2006 - respondents sayingpeople in 
their locality live in harmony v/s fight a lot
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Less than 13 percent of the respondents had heard of any violent incident in the community
4
 in 
the last year.  At the bivariate level (table 1), residents of Chittagong and Khulna had a much 
higher probability of reporting such incidents in their community and this was driven to a large 
extent by politically motivated violence.  The multivariate analysis, controlling for a range of 
individual and household characteristics including wealth quintile, land holding size and 
geographical area corroborates the bivariate results
5
.  Essentially, region of residence and 
exposure to the media really determines whether you have heard of violent incidents in the last 
year.  This commonsensical conclusion is nonetheless illuminating.  What it says to us is that no 
other characteristic of the household such as poverty level (although individuals in the second 
quintile are slightly more likely to report knowledge of violence), landownership or religion or 
characteristics of the individual such as education or age are correlated with heightened 
knowledge of violence.  On the other hand, residence in an urban area or in Khulna or 
Chittagong increases the probability of reporting knowledge of violence in the community.  By 
contrast, living in Sylhet reduces that probability.  Listening to the radio regularly also seems to 
make people more aware and they tend to report higher levels of knowledge of community 
violence. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Violent incident implies any one of the following – anyone‘s money was taken away or anyone assaulted outside 
the home or anyone encountered harassment while traveling or people physically hurt for political reasons.  The 
question does not include violence within the family 
5
 Annex 2 
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Table 1:  Bivariate relationship between knowledge of conflict and region in the last year  
 
 Barisal Chittagong Dhaka Khulna Rajshahi Sylhet Total 
Incident of conflict % reporting yes 
Anyone's money taken away against 
his/her wish 
13.33 20.28 17.55 17.23 10.29 9.06 15.29 
Anyone opposed women working 
outside the home 
1.45 13.4 2.43 4.4 5.35 3.17 5.29 
Anyone physically assaulted outside 
the home 
8.98 23.94 5.89 13.79 16.37 6.83 12.92 
Anyone encountered harassment 
while traveling 
5.78 14.99 4.14 12.18 8.6 2.38 8.14 
Anyone physically hurt for political 
reasons 
10.92 23.81 6.71 23.34 9.42 4.61 12.54 
Source:  Authors‘ calculations based on World Bank Gender Norms Survey 2006 
Note:  The relationship between region and gender norms/violence discussed in greater detail in World Bank, 2008 
 
People seem to ―live in harmony‖ in the community but violence against women is high.  While 
perception and knowledge of violence in the community are low, levels of violence within the 
family seem to be high, based on survey data. The WBGNS 2006 asked questions on spousal 
violence and found that 24 percent of women in the 45-60 age group and 30 percent of women in 
15-25 age group reported ever experiencing violence by their husbands.  An even higher 
proportion - over 43 percent of male heads of households reported ever having been violent to 
their wives.  The extent of violence reported by husbands against their wives is much higher than 
this in the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2004
6
.  Women in the WBGNS 2006 were 
also asked if they had experienced violence at the hands of anyone else and only 2 percent 
reported that they had. 
 
Dowry has been increasing in Bangladesh over time and the social norms moved from a regime 
of bride price to a regime of dowry in over the last two generations surveyed in the WBGNS 
2006.  It was practically non-existent in the older cohort of women surveyed– only 7.7 percent of 
these women compared to over 46 percent of younger women had to pay dowry at their 
weddings.  Its increase over time and the ―inflation of dowry rates‖ has also been associated with 
harassment of the woman and her family for more dowry (as reported in World Bank, 2008).  
Concomitantly, government and legal aid activists have realized that local dispute resolution 
systems are needed mainly to address family related matters (Asia Foundation, 2007; Hassan, 
2006)..  This picture is also in keeping with the type of cases that the major legal aid 
organizations receive. Thus, about three-fourths of the cases handled by the Bangladesh Legal 
Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) and (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) are 
family related (Hassan, 2006).  Among these, inheritance (intra-family property related disputes) 
seems to form a large part.  We have no information of the type of conflicts that arise against the 
state or service providers.  The picture we get from our surveys and from the existing literature is 
that the level of perceived conflict in the community is low and cases that do go to legal aid 
organizations are mainly family or property related.  The extent to which there is provider bias - 
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Perception of safety of women
Source:  World Bank Gender Norms Survey 2006
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Figure 2: Perception of safety of women 
Source: orld Bank ender Nor s Survey 2006 
determined by the focus of legal aid organizations themselves and the fact that they came into 
existence mainly to provide women with recourse against family disputes – is also unclear. 
 
There is a high perception of insecurity in public places: When women were asked if they had 
heard of a rape in the last year over 11 percent said yes compared to the fact that only 4 percent 
of men said yes (WBGNS, 2006).  Only 49 percent of older women and 38 percent of younger 
women feel safe going out at any time within their settlement (village or urban neighborhood). 
And strangely while a smaller proportion of men report having heard of rape, yet a larger 
proportion of them compared to women believe the external environment to be more unsafe for 
women.  Men also do not regard actual harassment or spousal violence to be as high as women 
do.  However, we have to address the issue of women‘s feelings of insecurity with some caution.  
It is for instance likely that this sense  of insecurity is instilled in them by their families or by the 
community narrative to ensure that women do not venture outside of acceptable public spaces – a 
narrative tied up as much by actual happenings in some historical past as well as by a feeling of 
protection for (or control of) women
7
.  As is true of other countries, in Bangladesh too, women 
living in urban areas report feeling more unsafe, as do women in certain divisions.  This result 
holds even after controlling for other background characteristics (World Bank, 2008). 
 
Anecdotal evidence and evidence 
from small samples suggests that 
violence against women outside 
the home could also be related to 
inter-family disputes regarding 
property.  The issue of acid 
attacks against women for 
instance, has featured 
prominently in the media.  In 
2004, 228 cases of acid burns 
were reported in the media and 
88 cases were filed. Of these 88 
filed cases, 25 girls and women 
were burnt because of family disputes, and 36 girls and women were burnt because of land 
disputes. Twenty one cases were the result of the woman‘s refusal to accept a man‘s proposal of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
love/marriage  or sexual relationship
8
.  Thus, property disputes and violence against women are 
often related. 
 
The low level of conflict between households may come as a surprise to many – including 
advocates of strengthening the justice system in Bangladesh.  However, this is not peculiar to 
Bangladesh.  A recent nationally representative survey in India asked a similar question and also 
found a very high perception of harmony.  The same survey also asked if a theft, break-in a 
physical attack or threat of attack had occurred in the last year.  Less than 3 percent of the 
households had experienced any of these events in the last year.
 9
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 On issues of measurement of intra-family violence and perception of security, see World Bank, 2008 
8
 D‘Costa, 2004 
9
 Sonalde Desai (personal communication, 2008) based on NCAER-University of Maryland Human Development 
Survey 2005.  Note that in the India survey the questions were regarding actual experience of respondent while in 
 7 
 
Let us however, not confuse perception of harmony with lack of conflict, or conflict with 
violence.  Here the WBGNS 2006 has limitations.  It focuses on knowledge of incidents of 
conflict.  It does not capture civil disputes such as those regarding property, about which 
complainants may seek mediation or other recourse.  The disputes that come to the Madaripur 
Legal Aid Association (MLAA), discussed later, are primarily family related but property related 
matters and enforcement of contracts also form a large part of the case-load.  Our content 
analysis of shalish ―stories‖ also shows that minor property disputes are common sources of 
tension between households. Other property related disputes stem from petty thefts.  In addition, 
shalish of all types and our own data from village courts indicate that there are large number of 
cases of theft, street fights and property disputes.   
 
There could be several reasons 
why the reported perception of 
harmony is so high. First, pride 
in their community may 
prevent residents from 
admitting to conflict.  Second, 
petty thefts may not be 
perceived as conflict.  Third, 
property disputes are often 
intra-family disputes and as 
such may not be understood as 
causes of conflict within the 
community.  Finally, violence 
may actually be preempted 
through acceptable dispute 
resolution mechanisms and the 
promise of recourse.  Of course 
each of these explanations is speculative, and there may be in fact be something in the way the 
question is asked that gets us these responses, underscoring the difficulties in measuring these 
issues.  What is clear is that perception of harassment of women and girls is much higher than 
perception of general conflict in both India and Bangladesh. 
 
Another limitation of the data at hand is that they do not capture conflicts arising from the 
demands for accountability by the citizens from the state.  Our tabulations from the WBGNS 
2006 indicate that access to services such as health and education are important problems listed 
by respondents.  Yet, whether grievance mechanisms to address these issues are working or not 
is not clear from the extant literature on Bangladesh. The Research and Evaluation Division of 
BRAC, for example, finds in its 2007 governance report that ―insecurities arising from 
administrative and judicial systems‖ were reported across three in-depth community case 
studies.
10
  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the WBGNS 2006 the questions were based on whether the respondent had heard of the occurrence of similar 
events in the community.  Therefore, the Bangladesh numbers look higher. 
10
 BRAC Governance Research Group (2007), p. 18. 
Figure 3: Perception of occurrence of spousal violence in the 
community safety of women 
Based on the question “Is it usual in your community for xx to happen” Perception of occurence of spousal violence in the community
Based on the question "Is it usual in your community for xx to happen"
Source:  World Bank Gender Norms Survey 2006
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II.  THE LANDSCAPE OF LOCAL JUSTICE 
 
Bangladesh has a range of local justice mechanisms with varying degrees of formality.  The 
traditional shalish is most informal at one end of the spectrum and the formal courts are at the 
other.  In terms of usage, while no hard empirical evidence is available, it is generally recognized 
that informal systems are resorted to much more often than are formal systems.  Most developing 
countries have multiple justice systems that co-exist and many have also had robust movements 
for reform.  This co-existence is particularly strong in South Asia and Africa.  The discourse 
around the role and nature of multiple justice systems, the extent to which rule of law and 
customary law can be applied, the issues around protection of human rights, among others are all 
common in these countries. 
 
In table 2 we show the various types of local justice mechanisms and their key characteristics. 
We then proceed to analyze what we know about these institutions, moving from the informal to 
the formal and focusing on the first three pillars, since our focus in this paper is on ―local 
justice‖.  We limit our treatment to civil justice, though we include in that category the minor 
crimes which can be resolved in shalish or in village courts with civil remedies. Later in the 
paper we discuss implications for reform. 
 
Table 2:  Bangladesh, like most countries, has a spectrum of mechanisms for dispute resolution 
 
Less formal                     More formal 
 
Traditional shalish.   NGO-reformed shalish Gram adalat (village 
courts) and arbitration 
councils 
The formal judiciary 
 
An assisted, 
participatory mediation 
process, often led by 
community elders and 
elites. 
NGOs have endeavored 
to improve the fairness 
of traditional shalish by: 
1) Including women as 
shalishkars,  
2) Providing shalishkars 
with training in law and 
human rights,  
3) Connecting shalish to 
legal aid, so that 
aggrieved parties have 
the option to pursue 
claims in the formal 
system. 
Courts authorized by 
statute and run by the 
Union Parishad 
Chairperson.  The VCs 
have jurisdiction over 
minor crimes and civil 
cases valuing 25,000 
Taka or less; the ACs 
have jurisdiction over 
family law issues like 
divorce and 
maintenance.  In the VC 
each party chooses two 
panelists, one of whom 
should be a UP member; 
in the AC each party 
chooses one panelist.  
Judgments are 
determined by a 
majority of the panel.   
A range of civil and 
criminal courts and 
tribunals, supervised in 
turn by the High and 
Appellate Divisions of 
the Supreme Court. 
Independent Legal Aid 
In addition to facilitating alternative dispute resolution, NGOs assist citizens in seeking remedies to 
breaches of their rights.   This work includes education, advocacy, and, in some instances, litigation in the 
formal courts.  GoB is also committed to promoting legal aid. 
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Box 1:  Is the Shalish fair?   
Between individualism, fatalism and 
communitarianism 
 
―When a verdict is pronounced, it must be accepted by 
us. There is nothing to be satisfied or dissatisfied, 
because it is done for the peoples’ benefit.‖     (Elite man 
in Dinajpur) 
 
―Nobody can be hundred percent happy with verdicts of 
shalish.‖ (UP Member in Mymensingh) 
 
―To make a shalish (successful) somebody has to (make 
a) sacrifice.‖ (UP Chairman in Mymensingh) 
―If accused and accuser are equally powerful (then the) 
verdict would be neutral.‖  (Adolescent boy in 
Mymensingh) 
 
―Shalish are not always fair.  The job of (the) jamat is to 
make compromise between parties.‖ (Poor man in 
Dinajpur) 
 
 ―No shalish can ever please all or can ever be neutral‖ 
(Poor man in Sunamgonj) 
―To keep their votes secure, UP chairman and members 
give a verdict to please both parties.‖  (Young women in 
Mymensingh) 
―We are poor people – we are working all day -we have 
no time to attend shalish‖. (Poor man in Dinajpur) 
 
 
A.  The Shalish 
 
In this section we discuss the traditional 
dispute resolution forums.  These include 
shalish, various committees at the local 
level, NGO facilitated shalish and shalish 
that is run by the UPs. 
 
Shalish may involve voluntary submission to 
arbitration (which, in this context, involves the 
parties agreeing to submit to the judgment of 
the shalish panel), mediation (in which the 
panel helps the disputants to try to devise a 
settlement themselves) or a blend of the two. In 
a harsh, extreme version of its traditional form, 
however, shalish instead constitutes a de facto 
criminal court that inflicts trial and punishment 
on individuals who have not consented to its 
jurisdiction (Golub, 2003; pages not 
numbered). 
 
The literature has documented the tension 
between the shalish as a fast and cheap 
mechanism for resolution of local and 
family disputes and its character as the 
enforcer of often retrogressive norms.  This 
line of documentation of traditional dispute 
resolution systems is not peculiar to 
Bangladesh and there is a strong body of 
international literature that addresses the issue of informal justice systems, their uses and abuses. 
 
From our qualitative data, it appears that the shalish is well-accepted in rural areas as a final 
dispute resolution forum.  Although many participants of focus groups pointed out that the 
decisions of shalish are often flawed, there is both recognition of the flaws and an acceptance of 
the institution.  This could be partly due to the fact that alternatives are limited and citizens seem 
to want to avoid courts and police. The acceptance contains elements of both fatalism and the 
confidence that a shalish will look out for the best interests of both parties within the constraints.  
There is also the appreciation that in any system of mediation no party will be completely happy. 
 
The importance of apology comes up repeatedly in the analysis of shalish ―stories‖ from our 
data.  For instance, a young woman whose mobile phone was stolen by her neighbor received 
compensation from the latter in keeping with the decision of the shalish.  However, he did not 
apologize to her or admit his guilt, which was why she was not satisfied with the decision.  
Apology is a typical remedy in non-formal, community dispute resolution institutions, and fits 
with those institutions‘ emphasis on restoration and reconciliation (Penal Reform International, 
2001). 
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Box 2 :  Shalish:  More inclusive now than in their 
mothers’ generation but there’s still a long way to go 
―Ten years back it was impossible for women to attend a 
shalish. Now women UP members and a few women are 
attending the shalish…. Women are also attending 
school governing bodies meetings. Men also allow them 
to speak, before men did not allow them to shalish and 
meetings.‖ (emphasis added) Elite woman in Sunamgonj 
during FGD 
 
 ―Nowadays women are going to shalish and meetings, 
but they are still observers.‖ Elite woman in Satkhira 
during FGD 
 
 ―I attend all shalish in the community.  As a UP 
member, I should not say women are not in leadership. 
But we are still fighting with men in this area‖. Female 
UP member in Satkhira during FGD 
 
 ―Women are not invited to the UP shalish – only the 
women UP members are invited. But sometimes we 
women are called in as witnesses.  And elderly women 
sometimes attend the shalish as complainants or 
accused.  We resolve our disputes with our neighbors or 
families within ourselves.‖ Mothers of adolescent girls in 
Dinajpur during FGD 
Despite its general accessibility, low cost and quick disposal, the literature on shalish has 
underscored its elitist character and the hazard that it perpetuates existing power structures.  That 
traditional dispute resolution systems are often undemocratic and exclusionary and access by 
women and the most marginalized such as landless people is poor have been well-documented.  
Few women are invited to sit on shalish as mediators or ―shalishkars‖, making other women less 
likely to approach the shalish. This is important because the large majority of the cases that 
women would like to see resolved are family based - particularly related to domestic and spousal 
violence. A key aspect of exclusion is that 
shalish decisions tend to enforce 
established social norms and in that sense 
may also deter women from participating. 
 
Young (unmarried) women especially face 
the greatest exclusion (box 4).  In a sense 
this exclusion is also related to the need to 
uphold norms of chastity and ―proper‖ 
behavior.  Since the shalish decide on cases 
of extra and pre marital relationships 
between men and women they are seen as 
corrupting influences on unmarried girls.  
Even without the discussion of these 
issues, younger women would likely have 
lower access to these as they do to other 
entitlements due to the intersection of age 
and gender (see Das Gupta, 1995). 
 
A related criticism of the shalish is that it 
has little appreciation of rule of law and 
serves as an enforcer of often retrogressive 
norms (Golub, 2003).  Such norms 
perpetuate the lower status of especially 
women and the poorest in relation to the richer and more powerful (Bode and Howes, 2002; 
Golub, 2003; Guirguis, 2004; Jahan, 2007; World Bank, 2008).  In our content analysis of 
shalish we found that indeed shalish tended to enforce traditional, extra-legal norms, though it is 
debatable whether the norms in the cases we encountered were retrogressive.  For instance, 
relations between men and women outside marriage (whether premarital or extramarital) are 
frowned upon so strongly that the shalish seems to enforce the accepted norm that such relations 
should either be legalized through marriage or be punished and marital ―harmony‖ restored. 
Other norms relate to the enforcement of age hierarchy which may in fact be a cementing factor 
in social relations.  In a dispute concerning two sisters-in-law, the younger woman had been 
violent to her older relative.  Her punishment was that she would apologize and touch the feet of 
the older woman. 
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Box 4:  Young women face particular exclusion from 
dispute resolution mechanisms  
 ―We have just observed shalish through the windows or 
from behind the wall. The UP member and UP female 
member played the main roles.  We have never 
participated in any sort of NGO shalish.‖ Adolescent 
out-of-school girls in Dinajpur during FGD 
 ―Our guardians prohibit us from going to the 
shalish……youngsters should not go to shalish.‖ School 
going adolescent girls in Mymensingh during FGD 
―We are not allowed to participate in any shalish (since 
it decides on) love affairs between boys and girls and 
divorce matters.‖ School going adolescent girls in 
Mymensingh during FGD 
 
―I have attended a shalish meeting as an observer. I did 
not say anything. The shalish was on a goat theft case in 
Taranipur village. The village elders and the women UP 
members were the shalish leaders‖. Young woman in 
Satkhira during FGD 
 
 
While our qualitative data did not show evidence of the infusion of religious law in the decisions 
of the shalish, other studies have pointed out that in fact this could well occur especially if imams 
and moulvis were invited to sit on the shalish as mediators (Bode, 2002).  The small body of 
literature that has documented illegal fatwas in Bangladesh also points out that these extra-
judicial pronouncements have the backing of elite religious groups (Pereira and Nargis, 2000) 
and that religious law can sometimes infuse collective decision-making.  
 
Box 3:  Marital Dispute and the Shalish:  Case from Dinajpur District 
 
There was a couple in Kamalpur village. The husband used to take drugs, leading to daily quarrels after which he 
would regularly beat his wife. The wife retaliated one day by hitting him.  When the matter escalated and the 
husband threatened to stab the wife, she wanted a separation.  A shalish took place in the village. Fathers of both 
husband and wife, UP Members and elite - as many as 60 people were present. The shalish recorded their argument. 
 
Verdict: Both were pronounced guilty. The father of the husband beat him with shoes and the father of the wife beat 
her as well, in the presence of the entire shalish. The couple committed in the shalish not to indulge in such behavior 
in future.  
 
Source:  As told by out of school adolescent girls in Dinajpur during focus group discussions.  When asked, the 
group expressed its satisfaction with the decision of the shalish. 
 
Often shalish have been criticized for their harsh and publicly humiliating punishments which 
violate human rights norms (BRAC, 2006).  We found some evidence of this in our analysis of 
shalish ―stories‖.  For instance, punishments to thieves were in the form of caning, sometimes in 
addition to the compensation they had to pay.  In another instance, a boy charged with harassing 
a girl had to have his face blackened (usually with soot) and wear a garland of shoes around his 
neck.  These humiliating practices 
traditionally serve as public punishments in 
South Asia.  In yet another instance 
reported later in this paper, a couple who 
had been violent to each other was punished 
by each being beaten with shoes by their 
respective fathers in front of the shalish.  
While public shaming has a value in 
restoring social cohesion, when such 
punishments become extreme, they can 
have negative consequences. 
 
However, the character of the shalish is 
probably quite dynamic and is evolving.  
This is noted by recent studies as well 
(Lewis and Hossain, 2004; Islam, 2002).  
Focus group discussions we conducted also 
underscored the growing participation of 
women in shalish as compared to several 
years ago (Box 2).   
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The shalish system, while retaining a patriarchal character, has shown itself capable of a 
measure of flexibility and increased inclusiveness. NGO credit programmes, and efforts 
to organise women for social action - such as within reforming versions of the shalish - 
have created both limited progress and some local resistance, which perhaps indicates 
potentially positive change (Lewis and Hossain, 2004: 20). 
 
Although it had a reputation for unjust treatment of the poor and for closing its door to 
women, the shalish has potential as a powerful instrument for local justice (Islam, 2002: 
99) 
 
This evolution of the shalish could well be related to multiple dispute resolution systems that can 
often co-exist at the village level.  Essentially a forum for mediation, a shalish it appears can be 
called by a range of actors and institutions in the village.  Any powerful institution like a mosque 
committee or a school management committee can call a shalish. In that sense there could be a 
multiplicity of shalish ―providers‖.  In Dinajpur, poor men during focus groups described dispute 
resolution through a mosque committee in each jamat/samaj (para). The jamat is composed of 
about 80/90 households. The mosque dispute resolution committee consists of 11 members. The 
chairman of the mosque is also the chairman of this committee. A complainant has to file a case 
(verbally) with the chairman of this dispute resolution committee.  Justice seekers from among 
this focus group referred to the decision of the mosque (dispute resolution) committee as 
―bichar‖ (literally ―contemplation‖ or ―views/decision‖). In yet another case, school boys 
described a shalish called by the School Management Committee in a complaint that involved 
harassment of a female student by a male student. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that when they have the choice, villagers can ―shop‖ for the best 
shalish and this perhaps enhances its role as an honest adjudicator.  Conversely, it is likely that in 
those areas where only a single type of (traditional) shalish operates and there is no competition 
among informal dispute resolution systems, there is also greater likelihood of elite capture. In our 
own focus groups we found a plethora of examples of shalish from groups in Dinajpur and 
Mymensingh, relatively fewer from Satkhira and very few examples from Sunamgonj. Focus 
groups of women too were much more vocal on shalish in the former two sites than they were in 
the latter two.   While it is difficult to judge adequacy of services without an indication of 
demand, our data on conflict seem to indicate that there is roughly similar level of demand for 
mediation across regions. 
 
NGO facilitated shalish:  Longstanding efforts spearheaded by NGOs and supported by multiple 
international donors focus on strengthening and reforming these systems to make them more 
equitable for women and the poorest.  Bangladesh civil society‘s innovation in community-level 
ADR is held up as an international example.  The reformed ADR forums include an equal 
number of women as shalishkars, and often address violations of women‘s rights such as 
violence, dowry demands, abandonment and maintenance.  The NGOs also assist parties in 
accessing the formal system when shalish is either not appropriate or not satisfactory.  The 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Centre (BRAC) probably runs one of the largest ADR systems 
in the world.  The activities of BRAC and legal aid organizations (Bangladesh Legal Aid and 
Services Trust, Ain-o-Shalish Kendro and Nagorik Uddyong) which also run the ―reformed 
shalish‖ are laid out in a table in Annex 3.  The example in box 5 shows the evolution of the 
shalish facilitated by an NGO in Satkhira district.  The reach of the reformed ADR is speculative 
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although a recent estimate puts its coverage to 30 percent of the country (Asia Foundation, 
2007).   
 
Box 5:  Ramzan Nagar Union, Satkhira:  Evolution of an NGO facilitated ADR forum 
 
Ward committees called Shou-Shamaj (well society) have been formed under the auspices of an NGO called 
Shushilon and have begun to play a role in local justice. The Shou Samaj is a 15 member committee that has the 
blessing of the UP Chairman and includes a UP member and the female UP member who are appointed by the 
Chairman.  Four of the 15 members in addition to the female UP member are women.  Others are village elites and 
forum facilitators are appointed by the NGO.  Complaints come to the committee which charges a fee of Tk 5.  
Complaints are recorded in writing and after ascertaining their validity, the committee issues a notice to both sides to 
come to the shalish.  Attendance of the 15 members seems to be patchy but in the year predating the research 
residents claimed that 60 percent disputes had been settled by this committee. Another 30 percent were settled by 
local elite outside the Shou-Shamaj Committee, and 10 percent went to the UP Chairman.  Focus group participants 
expressed a high level of satisfaction with the work of the committee, although attendance of all 15 members at 
every shalish has been a challenge. 
 
Union Parishad Facilitated Shalish:  NGO supported shalish have until now been the most 
written about, but the role of the UP seems to have increased dramatically in the conduct of the 
shalish.  This enhanced role of the UP as mediator comes through most clearly in our focus 
group discussions across the country. 
 
About 15-20 years ago almost 80 percent village disputes were resolved through village 
shalish. (The) Mahat (leader in the Hindu community) and Sarder (leader in the Muslim 
community) led the Shalish. UP chairmen and members were not very involved in 
Shalish, but now about 80 per cent disputes are going to the UP chairman and members. 
(Elite women in Dinajpur during focus group discussions) 
 
UP officials also say that conducting shalish is a key priority for them.  Some of this could be 
related to the growing political importance of the UP and the lack of commensurate discretionary 
power and resources available to them.  It is likely therefore, that UPs use their role as new elites 
in mediation – something that gives them added political power.  It is also likely that with the 
increasing push towards decentralization, the contact of UPs with higher levels of administration 
has increased.  Several small donor and NGO supported projects also focus on training of UPs.  
Associations of UPs have similarly become stronger.  Each of these related developments means 
that UPs now have better access to training and information on how to strengthen themselves and 
to acts and rules more generally, of which dispute resolution is an important part.  This growing 
role of UPs is interestingly absent from the discourse on local justice systems that is led by ―legal 
empowerment‖ organizations. 
 
But even shalish that are conducted by UPs can have different forms.  The variants were brought 
out by a UP Chairman in Mymensingh during focus group discussions.  He distinguished 
between a village shalish, a Shalishi Adalot
11
 or Aposh Shalish.  It appears that when the UP 
Chairman is present at a Shalish it can be called Shalishi Adalot or Aposh Shalish.  A written 
complaint is given to the Chairman who then mediates in consultation with shalishkars.   When 
                                                 
11
 The usage ―shlashi adalot‖ may appear to be an oxymoron.  Yet it seems to describe a forum that is more formal 
than a shalish and not quite an ―adalot‖ (court).  In some areas the arbitration councils are referred to as ―shalishi 
adalot‖ (Hassan, 2008, personal communication) 
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such a shalish sits in the UP office it is called a Shalishi Adalot and the Chairman is the main 
arbitrator.  The secretary writes the decisions of the shalish.  Few cases come to the village court 
(as told in a focus group discussion comprising elite men in Mymensingh).  Another Chairman 
said ―We prefer Shalishi Adalot to a village court. (The) Village court is not functioning 
well….(it has) a comparatively long procedure‖ (UP Chairman in Sunamgonj). 
 
Table 3:  Dispute resolution is seen as a priority of the Union Parishad 
 
Priority 1  Priority 2  
Road repair  and maintenance 100% Canal/pond re-excavation 31% 
Water and sanitation program 92% Tax assessment and collection 31% 
Culvert/pipe culvert repair & 
maintenance 
90% Sinking/installation of tubewell 21% 
Education awareness program 83% Agricultural development 21% 
Early marriage discouragement 73% Law and  order 21% 
Dowry discouragement 73% Religious festivals 17% 
Plantation 69% Repair of mosque and temple 10% 
Birth registration 63% Irrigation maintenance 6% 
Celebrations of national days 52% Fish culture 4% 
Village court (salish) 42% Dam construction 4% 
Women and children welfare 42% Disaster management  4% 
Source:  SDC, 2006 based on responses of chairpersons and members from 48 UPs 
 
The institution of salish constitutes a means through which the Chairman establishes and 
/or reinforces his network of potential electoral supporters among (secondary or tertiary) 
local leaders. Generally, the (perceived) aggrieved party files a case with the Union 
Parishad to request a salish. Initially, these cases are referred to local influential people 
who reside in or near the location of the crime or incident. Often the Chairman sends a 
UP member to oversee the ruling. In the context of Chairman‘s overall stature in the 
union, his acceptance and approval of a local leader‘s role and ruling in salish, affirms 
that individuals leadership position within the para / village. (Bode, 2002) 
 
Multiple mediators -  competition and assertion:  A number of processes, particularly the 
rising importance of elected representatives of the Union Parishad, the increasing penetration of 
NGO sponsored dispute resolution, combined with the movement towards legal empowerment of 
the poor has thrown up new social and political dynamics.  Elites and institutions are competing 
for spaces and spheres of influence.  Traditional elites are re-imagining themselves and new 
elites are carving out their roles.  Mediation of local disputes provides each set of elites with a 
powerful arena within which to exercise influence.  Thus, from an institutional perspective, the 
entire spectrum of local justice – a spectrum with the traditional shalish at one end and the 
village courts at the other, and the NGO-sponsored shalish in between – also signifies a social 
and political churning in Bangladesh. 
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Concomitantly, there appears to be some degree of competition between the NGO shalish and 
the UP shalish (and village courts).  This may be more in the nature of different institutions and 
elites trying to expand their spheres of influence.  Sometimes there is open tension between 
established legal aid organizations that conduct their own shalish and the UP, as evidenced by 
Banu‘s (2003) review of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)-Ain o Salish 
Kendro (ASK) legal aid program.  At times there are allegations of bribery and ―miscarriage of 
justice‖ by the UP and conversely, the UP has on occasion accused the NGO-sponsored shalish 
to be unfair.  At one level the competition between different providers of justice is probably 
positive as we have argued earlier in this paper, and in a hierarchical society where women and 
the landless are particularly excluded, the competition provides justice-seekers with alternatives.  
At another level, the importance of non-state justice systems could potentially undermine the role 
of state sponsored justice systems. 
 
This competition also perhaps co-exists with the fact that in many areas NGOs have trained UPs 
in the functioning of village courts and in the conduct of a fair shalish.  Democracy Watch, ASK 
and the Hunger Project are illustrative but there are many others as well who conduct training of 
UPs in dispute resolution.  Other models like Sushilon described in this paper have established 
dispute resolution committees that include the UP member and elites who would have run the 
traditional shalish.  While residents express a high level of satisfaction with these committees it 
is speculative as whether the committees create fragmentation (or multiplicity) of elites and 
whether this creates the conditions for more or less inclusive justice systems. Still others like 
MLAA are committed to activating village courts and work with state systems while using their 
own resources.  
  
Box 6:  Change in justice-seeking behavior:  Shrimp cultivation and increasing use of formal systems 
 
Twenty-twenty five years back in Ramzan Nagar Union (Satkhira), most disputes were settled within the village. 
According to focus group participants, 80 percent of disputes used to be settled by local Matobbar (elite), 20 percent 
by the UP chairman and the remaining 10 percent went to the thana (police station/formal courts).   By 2005, 20 
percent of disputes were settled by village Matobbar, 60 percent by the UP Chairman and 20 percent of cases went 
to the thana (Upazila).   
 
The Satkhira area developed into a center for shrimp cultivation in the 1990s and conflicts are said to have increased 
due to illegal occupation of shrimp ―ghers‖ and forcible sale of lands of poor cultivators.  Residents indicate that the 
majority of shrimp ―gher‖ related disputes go to the police.  Here the Upazilla Nirbhahi Officer (administrator), 
police department and Thana Fishery Officer play a vital role. 
 
B.  The Village Courts 
 
The Village Courts Act of 2006, which replaced and updates the Village Courts Act of 1976, 
provides for the establishment of a village court in every Union Parishad.  The village court is 
comprised of a panel of five: the UP chairperson; two other UP council members, one of whom 
is chosen by each party in the dispute; and then two additional citizens, who are also chosen by 
the parties respectively.  The courts have jurisdiction over civil disputes valuing up to 25,000 
Taka.  They also have jurisdiction over some crimes, including assault and theft, though they do 
not have the power to fine or imprison; rather they can grant simple injunctions and award 
compensation up to 25,000 Taka (Village Courts Act 2006). 
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The Muslim Family Ordinance of 1961 provides for arbitration councils to deal with family 
matters, including divorce, dowry, and maintenance.  Arbitration council panels are comprised of 
three members: the UP chairperson and two others, one of whom is chosen by each party.  Like 
the village courts, arbitration councils also have the power to issue binding decisions, though the 
Muslim Family Ordinance does not set a limit on the size of judgments (Muslim Family Law 
Ordinance 1961). 
 
Administratively, the nodal department in charge of UPs is the Local Government Division 
(LGD) within the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government.  Village courts and 
arbitration councils are also under the supervision of LGD, rather than of the Ministry of Law, 
Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs.  This placement reflects the distinctiveness of the village 
courts and arbitration councils from the rest of the judicial system:  Village courts and arbitration 
councils are more local and less legal. 
 
The Madaripur Legal Aid Association (MLAA), founded in 1978, has long engaged in 
facilitating shalish and in providing legal assistance.  In recent years, the MLAA has worked in 
100 Unions in Madaripur, Shariatpur, and Gopalganj Districts to activate and strengthen village 
courts and arbitration councils.  MLAA trains UP chairpersons and council members in dispute 
resolution, monitors the functioning of 
village courts and arbitration councils, 
and popularizes the institutions through 
drama and awareness campaigns.  
MLAA also provides each village court 
with a full-time  ―court clerk‖ – a 
functionary who accepts case 
applications, conducts outreach, and 
keeps court records. The village courts 
have a very high disposal rate.  
Between July 2006 and June 2007, for 
example, the 100 Unions in which 
MLAA works carried over 347 cases 
from prior months and received 5,133 applications for new cases.  Out of those 5,480 cases, 
4,670 were decided, 343 were dropped, one was referred for certificate, and 489 remained 
pending.  MLAA‘s work was the inspiration for a recently established EU-LGD partnership to 
activate village courts at a larger scale. 
 
It is widely held that, outside of MLAA‘s coverage area, village courts are largely defunct and 
UP members have little knowledge of the Village Courts Act (Bode, 2002; Lewis and Hossain, 
2005; Hassan, 2006; Hossain, Moran, and Stapleton, 2007). 
 
―A system of formal village courts located at the union parishad, which has rarely been 
effective, has now in most cases disappeared. This leaves the traditional informal shalish 
as the dominant means of adjudication for small-scale civil and criminal disputes.‖ 
(Lewis and Hossain, 2005: 19-20).   
 
However, no study has a large enough sample to assert this with representative empirical 
validity. 
Figure 4: Cases in MLAA village courts July 2006-June 2007
Source:  MLAA
Land dispute
13.6%
Financial 
dispute
9.8%
Assault
7.9%
Social dispute
6.4%
Other
4.8%
Dowry
29.3%
Second 
marriage
0.4%
Family Dispute
27.8%
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We conducted phone interviews with 40 UP chairpersons from all six divisions and thirty 
different districts.
12
  Our research did not confirm the view that village courts are defunct.  Every 
chairperson interviewed reported conducting village courts; 30 out of the 40 chairpersons 
reported holding court one time per week or more.  Common case types included family 
disputes, land disputes, physical conflict, minor theft, forgery, and loan recovery.  All 
chairpersons reported deploying the UP secretary to maintain a registry of cases.  Also, all 
chairpersons explained, when asked ―who makes the decisions,‖ that the UP Chairperson sits on 
a panel with other panelists chosen in equal number by either party.  Most of these chairpersons 
specified, as the Village Courts Act specifies, that their courts included four additional panelists, 
two of whom should be UP members.  Seven out of 40 chairpersons reported different sizes of 
panels, such as three per side, five per side, or a flexible panel size. 
 
Table 4:  Some Results from Interviews with Chairpersons 
 
Question Responses of 40 UP Chairpersons Interviewed 
Do you run a village court? 100% said yes; 75% said either once, twice, or three times a week. 
Are you aware of the Village Courts Act? 85% said yes. 
Who makes the decisions in village court? 100% explained a panel that includes chairperson plus panelists 
chosen by either side; most explained the exact structure specified in 
the Act. 
Do other dispute resolution mechanisms 
operate in your UP? 
100% said that shalish also takes place in their UP. 
Do NGOs facilitate/ operate shalish in your 
UP? 
37.5% gave a clear yes; 45% gave a clear no; answers of 17.5% 
were unclear.   
If a party is dissatisfied with the judgment of 
a village court, what recourse does he/she 
have if any? 
92.5% said that if a party was dissatisfied, he or she could appeal in 
civil court. (Many of these respondents pointed out that parties are 
seldom dissatisfied). 
 
We should not exaggerate the significance of these figures, as this is a small sample and it 
reflects only the subjective views of UP chairpersons.  It is possible, for example, that a 
chairperson would exaggerate the extent to which he runs a village court, or that NGOs facilitate 
shalish in a UP without the chairperson‘s knowledge.  But this modest data suggests that the 
village courts are more alive than they have been made out to be. 
 
When asked about the difference between village courts and shalish, over 25 percent of 
chairpersons pointed out that the village court process was relatively long and formal.  Some 
noted that while shalish can be conducted in or near the homes of the parties, village courts 
require parties and witnesses to travel to the UP headquarter.  It is not surprising that a state-
authorized process would entail more complexity and more cost than an informal community 
process.  But the chairpersons did not articulate what one might consider to be the key 
distinguishing feature between the two institutions.  When asked about the difference between 
                                                 
12
 Twenty-nine of these UPs were chosen from the list of UPs involved in the first year of the Local Government 
Support Program.  UPs on that list were chosen for being well-performing, and so this shouldn‘t be considered a 
random sample.   
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village courts and shalish, not one chairperson mentioned that the village courts allow panels to 
issue binding decisions whereas shalish depends on voluntary settlement.  Moreover, when asked 
to describe ―what sorts of judgments are delivered,‖ many chairpersons described the village 
courts as striving for ―mutual agreement.‖ 
 
Perhaps the distinction between mediation and adjudication is lost on these chairpersons because 
their authority is in fact relatively weak.  When asked for suggestions on how to improve the 
system, over half the chairpersons complained that the village courts lack the power to enforce 
their decisions.  But if chairpersons have little enforcement power, and if village courts cost 
more in time and money than shalish, then why is the caseload so high that 75 percent of our 
respondents report operating village court once or more per week?  One hypothesis is that there 
is indeed strong demand for state-authorized adjudication, and that aggrieved parties consider 
even the weak authority which chairpersons reportedly wield to be worth the additional cost of 
bringing a case in the village court.  The question of the level of demand for village courts, and 
the motivations of those who approach village courts as opposed to other mechanisms, merits 
further research. 
 
About a third of the chairpersons explained that cases involving damages greater than the 
statutory limit for the village court were being resolved by shalish.  An equal proportion of 
chairpersons (significant overlap but not all the same ones) argued in response to the request for 
comments and/or suggestions that the statutory limit should be raised to broaden the village 
courts‘ jurisdiction.  These responses reflect, first, awareness of the Village Courts Act and at 
least expressed compliance with the Act‘s jurisdictional boundary.  Fourteen out of 40 
chairpersons mentioned that the limit was 25,000 Taka, demonstrating that they were familiar 
with the 2006 Act; four chairpersons mentioned that the limit was 5,000 Taka, demonstrating 
that they were familiar with the 1976 Ordinance but not the 2006 version; others did not specify 
an amount. 
 
Second, the responses reveal what is probably an unintended consequence.  The Village Courts 
Act‘s upper limit on the value of judgments is likely meant to direct cases involving larger sums 
to the formal courts where, presumably, judicial competence is greater and where the nuance of 
formal law will be applied.  At least some parties, it seems, are either unable or unwilling to 
invest the additional time and expense required to avail of the formal courts‘ greater judicial 
sophistication.  The village courts, though reportedly more difficult to access than shalish, are 
still far more accessible than the formal courts.  Three quarters of the chairpersons reported 
charging 10 Taka or less to file a case (eight of these said they charged no fees at all).  The other 
chairpersons all charged 60 Taka or less, except one chairperson in Chittagong District who 
reported charging 125 Taka.
13
  Unwilling or unable to file formal court action, and faced with a 
jurisdictional limit in the village courts, parties apparently move in the opposite direction on the 
formality spectrum, towards the voluntary and informal shalish. 
 
                                                 
13
 The Village Courts Act (2006) refers to a ―prescribed fee‖ (§ 4.1) but does not specify an amount.  A grain of salt: 
we imagine that the question ―how much do you charge‖ is one of those most likely to induce a duplicitous 
response. 
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We emphasize, again, that these are preliminary inferences from a small sample and from only 
one kind of actor, namely the UP chair.  But they do raise questions worthy of further, systematic 
study.  
III.  POLICY CHOICES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM 
 
Every band on the spectrum of dispute resolution, from the traditional shalish to the Supreme 
Court, is arguably in need of further investment and reform.  Because our focus here is on local, 
civil justice, we address in particular the reform possibilities in the village courts, in ADR, and in 
legal aid.  We cannot ignore the formal judiciary by any means, for one of the crucial sets of 
questions is how best to integrate these local institutions into the larger system of justice.  But we 
will leave aside for now those challenges which can be characterized as exclusively the domain 
of the formal courts. 
Strengthening Village Courts 
 
The experience of MLAA suggests that the village court system may be a useful bridge between 
Bangladesh‘s informal and formal institutions.  On the one hand, village courts are far more 
affordable, speedy, and geographically accessible than formal courts.  On the other hand, unlike 
mediation, the village courts have, at least in principle, the authority to issue binding decisions.  
Though the point was not made explicit in our phone interviews with UP chairpersons, our 
observation of MLAA village courts did suggest that village courts can provide useful recourse 
to one of the classic problems of voluntary dispute resolution: that intransigent and powerful 
parties can refuse to reach fair settlements (e.g. Hensler, 2003).
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Village courts are also attractive from a cost and sustainability perspective: they are run by the 
Union Parishads, an already-existing institution with nation-wide scope. To recognize such 
potential in the village courts is not to diminish the crucial functions filled by both shalish and by 
the formal courts.  Though the shalish risks reproducing inequities of gender and power, it is 
valued as a process for participatory community reconciliation (Lewis and Hossain, 2005).  And 
although the formal courts are costly, slow, and sometimes corrupt, they play a unique role in the 
setting of precedent and the public articulation of rights (e.g. Fiss, 1984).  To take a present-day 
example: no shalish could substitute for the law courts as the locus for the momentous corruption 
prosecutions that took place in 2008 in Bangladesh. 
 
But the village courts may play a useful intermediate role between these two sets of institutions.  
The state has expressed its commitment to this idea in the Village Courts Acts of 1976 and 2006, 
and in the government‘s recently initiated partnership with the EU to strengthen village courts. 
 
It is worth considering, as the government develops its approach, the experience of analogous 
interventions in other countries. The nyaya panchayat in India was envisioned as a judicial 
counterpart to the Indian gram panchayat; the two together are parallel to gram adalat and Union 
Parishad in Bangladesh.  Nyaya panchayats were developed out of an attempt ―Following 
independence . . . to establish village-level courts as a means of increasing access to formal 
                                                 
14
 Hensler argues that ADR, when pushed on litigants, can disadvantage less powerful parties because of their 
weaker negotiating position. 
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justice in rural areas in India‖  (Penal Reform International, 2001: 86).  The nyaya panchayats 
blended characteristics of formal and traditional justice.  Like the Bangladeshi village courts, 
nyaya panchayats were not bound by the formal legal rules of evidence and procedure; their 
members were not legally trained; they had jurisdiction over civil disputes and minor crimes, but 
lacked the power to fine or imprison; and their decisions were subject to appeal into the formal 
courts. 
 
The nyaya panchayat is judged to have been a failed experiment.  Citizens considered the nyaya 
panchayats foreign and inaccessible in relation to their own traditional justice institutions, but not 
legitimate or powerful enough for their most serious claims.  So ―the vast majority of disputes . . 
. were resolved under traditional mechanisms‖ while ―those willing and able to take their dispute 
further afield tended to bypass the nyaya panchayats and utilize the more formal state courts‖  
(Penal Reform International, 2001: 88).  Several states formally banned the nyaya panchayats; by 
the late 1970s they were considered moribund (Penal Reform International, 2001; Galanter and 
Krishnan, 2004).
15
 
 
One key difference between nyaya panchayats and gram adalats is in panel composition.  Nyaya 
panchayat members had permanent seats, and were elected by gram panchayat members.  Fazlul 
Huq, founder of MLAA, considers the structure of Bangladesh village court panels to be the 
institution‘s defining feature.  Each party is guaranteed to have two panelists whom he or she 
respects, and the fifth is someone who is accountable, via elections, imperfect though they are, to 
the community at large (Huq, February, 2008). 
 
Other countries have also experimented with hybrid justice institutions, though perhaps none 
bears as close a historical and institutional resemblance to the Bangladeshi village court as the 
nyaya panchayat.  In Peru, some 4,600 unpaid, lay justices of the peace have limited jurisdiction 
over small civil cases and minor crimes.  They adjudicate by a simple, oral process in which the 
emphasis is on conciliation and the parties represent themselves.  NGOs have provided basic 
training in law, but the justices of the peace generally combine law with local custom.  Until 
1999 the justices of the peace were selected by the superior courts of each district, often on the 
recommendation of local notables.  In 1999 they were elected for the first time, which added 
younger people and some women to their ranks.  These justices of the peace have a relatively 
long history, dating to at least the 1970s, and have widely been considered to be popular and 
successful in providing affordable, accessible justice (Hammergren 2007). 
 
The Philippines established a Barangay Justice System in 1978.  Like the Union Parishad in 
Bangladesh, the Barangay is the most local political unit in the Philippines.  And like 
Bangladeshi village courts, the Barangay justice system lies between customary legal systems -
especially diverse in the Philippines, in part because the country is an archipelago—and the 
formal court system. 
                                                 
15
 The Ministry of Panchayati Raj drafted the Nyaya Panchayat Bill, 2006, proposing to revive nyaya panchayats at 
a national level, but the bill has not been passed.  It is opposed by the Law Ministry on several grounds, including: 
1) choosing nyaya panchayat members by elections would weaken judicial independence and 2) granting legal 
jurisdiction to laypeople without legal training would be dangerous and would violate requirements set out by the 
jduiciary.  The Law Ministry has drafted competing legislation to extend the formal judiciary to a more local level, 
the Grama Nyayalayas Bill, 2007.  The Gram Nyayalayas Bill has been introduced in parliament but not passed. 
(Upadhyay 2008).  
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The Barangay justice system has jurisdiction over civil cases between private persons (cases 
involving firms or public officials are excluded); it can also address, through civil remedies, 
crimes punishable by less than a year.  When a complaint is filed the Barangay chief—an elected 
official equivalent to the UP chairperson—first attempts mediation or arbitration depending on 
the preference of the parties.  If these initial efforts do not succeed, the chief constitutes a 
―conciliation panel‖ of three persons from the Bangaray Justice Committee; the committee is 
made of up 10 to 20 persons selected every three years by the village chief.  The conciliation 
panel also attempts mediation; if this too fails the village chief provides a ―certificate to file 
action‖ which allows parties to lodge a case in formal court. 
 
Surveys suggest that the Barangay system is highly regarded by past users and by the general 
population.  Between 1999 and 2005, the Barangay system successfully mediated 75 to 85 
percent of the cases it received.  Problems identified with the system include the politicization of 
decisions, which is thought to stem in part from the concentration of power in the hands of the 
village chief; unfairness in relation to gender issues, which may be due in part to the fact that 
very few women are chosen as justice committee members; and a lack of training and 
standardization in arbitration and mediation technique (Mercado 2008). 
 
The post-independence government in Tanzania sought to develop a consistent national system 
to unify and render more uniform the local, tribal legal institutions that had been recognized 
under the British colonial strategy of indirect rule.  In 1969 the government established 
arbitration tribunals, later renamed ward tribunals, which are panels of up to five lay mediators 
who seek voluntary resolution of local disputes.  Like the Bangladesh village courts, these 
tribunals are not supervised by the judiciary but are linked to it by a right to appeal from the 
tribunals into the formal courts.  The tribunals are managed by district-level government 
administrators.  A 2003 study of ward tribunals in the Babati District in North-central Tanzania 
found that, though they are considered to have some bias towards wealthier parties, and though 
the arbitrators are primarily male elders, community members ranked the tribunals as more ―just 
and fair‖ than any other dispute resolution mechanism, including the formal courts, village and 
religious elders, and party organs (Lawi 2003).  A study of the Kilimanarjo region of Tanzania, 
however, found that many communities favored unrecognized community-based dispute 
resolution to the state-administered ward tribunals (Moore 1992). 
 
What leads some versions of such intermediate structures, like the lay justices of the peace in 
Peru and the ward tribunals in Babati District, to earn the trust of the people they serve while 
other versions, like the nyaya panchayats and perhaps the ward tribunals in Kilimanjaro fail to do 
so?  We will explore the implications of international experience further as we address specific 
possibilities and challenges posed by the Bangladesh village courts.  We divide the discussion 
into the broad categories of fairness and effectiveness. 
 
Fairness 
 
 What substantive law should the village courts apply?  The Village Courts Act 
exempts village courts from the Evidence Act, the Criminal Procedure Code, and the 
Civil Procedure Code, but is silent on the question of what substantive law the village 
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courts should apply.  Given that these institutions, at least in theory, wield the power of 
the state, there might be an interest in ensuring that they apply consistent, valid laws.  
One might also hope that statutory and constitutional law would guard against 
discriminatory practices and local bias.  On the other hand, it may be unrealistic to train 
UP members in formal law.  According to the present structure, two of the five panelists 
may not be UP council members at all, and discrepancies in levels of training among 
panelists might work to disempower the non-council members on the panel.  The nyaya 
panchayats in India were ―required to conform to and to apply statutory law,‖ yet they 
were not trained to do so.  According to Galanter and Baxi (1979), the gap between 
mandate and actual capacity contributed to public distrust.  On the other hand the success 
of the Peru justices of the peace is attributed in part to the justices‘ ability to draw on 
local customary law.  It may be that the silence of the Village Courts Act is wise, that the 
village courts should only abide by the laws of common sense, and that the objectives of 
consistency and fairness should be sought by other means than the imposition of 
substantive statutory law. 
 
 Protecting Fundamental Rights.  Even if it is impractical to require village courts to 
apply the general body of Bangladeshi law, government may wish to require village court 
decisions to comply with a narrower set of fundamental substantive rights, to be 
conveyed in trainings and in written materials.  Civil society could assist in identifying 
rights that are most endangered by community dispute resolution, and in developing 
methods and materials for conveying a core body of rights to UP members.
16
 
 
 How to mitigate the risk of a chairperson abusing his or her authority?  Unlike the 
national government, which has moved towards greater separation of the judiciary from 
the executive, the current structure concentrates both executive and judicial authority in 
the UP chairperson.  UP chairpersons are generally powerful individuals to begin with, 
and the power of the position is growing with decentralization.  Who checks the 
chairperson?  What holds him or her accountable besides elections?  The arbitration-style 
structure of the panel, with two panelists of each party‘s choosing sitting alongside the 
chairperson, should provide some protection against abuse of authority by the chair.  
Below are a few other structural provisions that might be worth considering.  Too much 
complexity can itself be a source of abuse, however; the challenge will be to incorporate 
basic checks without undoing the institution‘s simplicity. 
 
o Requiring that village court be held in public. 
o Elaborating rules for recusal when a chairperson has family or business relations 
with a party in a dispute. 
o Allowing parties a ‗peremptory strike‘—a chance to reject the chairperson or a 
panelist without showing cause—as is often provided for in formal arbitration.   
o Rotating chairmanship of the village court among council members. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Raja Devashish Roy makes a similar suggestion in relation to indigenous legal systems.  He argues for greater 
recognition of such systems, but advocates revising customary law when it violates, for example, the basic rights of 
women under international law (Roy, 2005). 
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Effectiveness 
 
 What sort of training is necessary and appropriate?  The contents of the Village 
Courts Act—including subject matter and territorial jurisdiction, contempt of court 
provisions, appeals procedure, power to summons—seem necessary at a minimum.  Bode 
(2002) notes confusion, for example, among UP members about the relationship between 
village courts and shalish.  Substantive legal training may be limited to a core set of 
fundamental rights, as indicated above.  It may also be valuable to train UP council 
members in techniques of arbitration.  The EU project document proposes that the 
Judicial Administration Training Institute serve as the primary provider of training for UP 
members.  It seems it would also make sense to engage MLAA and others who have 
extensive experience in making village courts work. 
 
 Raise the jurisdictional limit on the value of cases?  As we indicated above, our 
preliminary research suggests that there may be substantial demand for the village courts 
to resolve cases of greater value than Tk. 25,000.  The present limit seems to have the 
effect of steering higher-value cases towards shalish, which is perhaps the mechanism 
least equipped to deal with such cases, as it lacks state authority and its decisions are 
subject to no oversight.  
 
 How to strengthen the enforcement powers of the village courts?  Our interviews with 
chairpersons suggest that village court rulings are often unenforceable.  One shouldn‘t 
take the chairpersons pleas for more power as the only word, of course; it would be 
useful to find out from claimants their experience in recovering on village court 
judgments.  Without genuine enforcement power, the village court is not an intermediate 
institution but a stylized shalish.  The present Act instructs the UP to recover under the 
Public Demands Recovery Act of 1913, which involves presenting a certificate of the 
judgment to a collector, an upazila magistrate, or an upazila nirbahi officer.  Training UP 
members in this procedure may help.  Involving the upazila in enforcement of judgments 
may be positive from an accountability perspective, in that it provides an opportunity for 
a kind of monitoring and oversight from outside the UP itself.  But further research into 
the effectiveness of this procedure may be warranted. 
 
 Strengthen integration with the formal judiciary.  MLAA‘s experience is that appeals 
to civil court are quite rare, because of the same barriers of cost and time that prevent 
ordinary citizens from bringing actions to the formal courts in the first instance.  It may 
be useful to consider some more proactive form of judicial supervision.  Judges might 
periodically review the records and practices of village courts.  This would be one way of 
improving consistency and of placing a check on the chairperson‘s authority.  The judges 
could be asked to monitor compliance with the Village Courts Act and with core 
fundamental rights rather than compliance with Bangladesh law in general.  Introducing a 
supervisory responsibility means additional work for already-pressed judges, though in 
principle stronger village courts should lighten case loads in the entry-level law courts. 
 
 Administrative assistance for village courts?  MLAA posits that the provision of a 
secretary is crucial for the effective functioning of a village court, given the other 
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demands on a UP chairperson‘s time and the importance of transparent, well-kept 
records.  The chairpersons interviewed all reported that they deployed the existing UP 
secretary to fulfill this function, though we have had no look, of course, at the quality of 
their records.  A few chairpersons did contend, when asked for suggestions, that 
additional administrative assistance was necessary for the court to function properly.  The 
EU project document proposes adding an additional staff member at the UP level for this 
purpose.  Is that something to which LGD can commit nation-wide?  Is there room for 
further state-NGO partnership, along the lines of the MLAA?  Could the decision and 
responsibility be left to the discretion of individual UPs, based on the availability of local 
revenue and the needs of the Union? 
Strengthening ADR and Legal Aid 
 
 As mentioned above, a strengthening of village courts can be conceived of as a complement 
to, not a substitute for, civil society efforts to improve non-state dispute resolution and to 
provide independent assistance in seeking redress for injustice. 
 
 Expanding the scope of NGO-reformed shalish.  NGO-reformed shalish improves 
on the fairness and gender inclusivity of traditional shalish, and provides parties with 
a link to the formal legal system when necessary.  The Asia Foundation estimates that 
legal aid NGOs provide ADR services to some 30% of the country, and that formal 
court services are provided to some 35% (Asia Foundation, 2007: 11).  DFID has 
committed to expanding that coverage significantly, though it is in the process of 
reformulating the design of its project. 
 
 Ensuring independence.  One critical function of legal aid is to hold the state 
accountable for abuses against, and neglect of, its citizens.  To do this work 
effectively, legal aid needs a measure of autonomy from the state.
17
  Some countries, 
like South Africa, have sought a middle ground between integration and 
independence.  The South African legal aid board is funded by the government but 
structurally autonomous from it.  Organizations receiving funding from the legal aid 
board are not hampered from efforts that would challenge the government; indeed, 
some of South Africa‘s most famous impact litigation cases originated with the help 
of government legal aid funds.  The same might be said of the United Kingdom, 
where the legal services commission gives £24 million annually to citizens‘ advice 
bureaus.  As with South Africa, citizens‘ advice bureaus which receive monies from 
the U.K. legal services commission are not seen to suffer any loss in independence.  If 
DFID decides to implement its legal aid project through UNDP, does UNDP‘s close 
                                                 
17
 The history of civil legal aid in the United States is a troubling case in point. Civil legal services received strong 
support under Lyndon Johnson‘s War on Poverty and grew steadily through the 1970s. These legal services 
programs succeeded in achieving myriad significant reforms of state policy. Legal aid lawyers translated the 
experiences of their clients into reform efforts by bringing impact cases, including class actions, and by lobbying 
legislatures. Ronald Reagan first attacked legal services as governor of California and continued to do so as 
president. Republicans were aghast that federal money was going toward changing government policies according to 
the interests of poor people. Legislation passed in 1996, during Newt Gingrich‘s ―Republican Revolution,‖ gutted 
what was left of legal services funding and placed crippling restrictions on legal aid lawyers: no class actions, no 
lobbying legislatures, no representing prisoners or illegal aliens, etc. (See Quigley, 1998: 260-261). 
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relationship with government pose any risk to the independence of legal aid?  Would 
Bangladesh consider the formation of an autonomous but federally funded legal aid 
board? 
 
 Supporting village courts and holding them accountable.  Legal aid organizations 
may play an important role in the training and monitoring of village courts.  A 
continuous interaction with civil society may foster incremental changes in norms and 
decisions, as it has been found to do in some efforts at NGO-reformed shalish  (E.g. 
Siddiqi, undated).  When a vulnerable party receives an unjust decision, legal aid 
organizations may assist in bringing an appeal, thereby supporting citizens to hold the 
village courts accountable. 
 
 Avoiding breaches of judicial process.  Civil society representatives in Bangladesh 
report instances of parties dissatisfied with a village court decision raising the same 
case fresh in an NGO-facilitated shalish.  Such breaches of legal process can 
undermine the village courts and place NGOs at odds with government.  It is 
important that legal aid workers understand the Village Courts Act.  If a legal aid 
NGO comes across an unjust decision by a village court, that NGO could assist the 
aggrieved party in bringing an appeal into formal court. 
 
 Extending accountability efforts to local government.  As the UPs take on greater 
governance responsibilities, there will be a corresponding need for civil society to 
play a greater role in monitoring local government and holding it accountable.  Legal 
aid NGOs can assist citizens to take action in response to corruption, abuse of 
authority, and failures in service delivery.  This work will involve advocacy with UPs 
and with administrative agencies as well as, in some cases, formal court action. 
Research, Evaluation and Evidence-Based Policy 
 
A truly informed strategy for strengthening local justice—and justice as a whole—requires richer 
and more rigorous information about the functioning and impact of various institutions than is 
now available.  Linn Hammergren notes that evaluations of access to justice interventions 
usually amount to ―headcounts‖ of how many clients, how many cases resolved.  Those numbers 
are important but different from the more complicated question of what impact the intervention 
has on the lives of the people it served, and on the rule of law in the community where it took 
place.  Also usually missing is a consideration of opportunity cost: how does the impact of this 
investment compare with other uses of the same resources (Hammergren, 2007). 
 
Hammergren and others encourage policy makers to consider the justice system as a whole, and 
to make investments in a coordinated and balanced way, based on evidence of the impact of any 
given investment on the overall goal of providing the ―best, and most equitably delivered justice 
service [society] can render‖  (Hammergren, 2007; see also Jensen, 2003). 
 
In Bangladesh this would require sophisticated quantitative and qualitative research into the 
demand for justice and the impact of the various justice institutions on the lives of Bangladeshis.  
Government would need to coordinate across branches given that the village courts, the frontline 
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of state justice provision, are under the responsibility of the local government ministry rather 
than the judiciary.  Civil society, which tends naturally towards a diversity of approaches, may 
also benefit from objective analysis of the impact of interventions, greater coordination of 
investments, and more practical division of labor. 
 
 
POLICY MATRIX FOR STRENGTHENING LOCAL JUSTICE IN BANGLADESH 
   
Policy Goal Possible Reform Measures 
Strengthening fairness of 
village courts. 
 Do not require village courts to apply general Bangladeshi formal law, but 
identify a core set of fundamental rights which the courts should respect.   
 Mitigate the risk of a chairperson abusing his or her authority, through: 
o Requiring that village court be held in public. 
o Elaborating rules for recusal when a chairperson has family or business 
relations with a party in the dispute. 
o Allowing parties a ‗peremptory strike‘—a chance to reject the 
chairperson or a panelist without showing cause—as is often provided for 
in formal arbitration.   
o Rotating chairmanship of the village court among council members. 
Strengthening effectiveness 
of village courts. 
 Provide training to UP members in: 
o Contents of Village Courts Act, including jurisdiction, contempt of court 
provisions, appeals procedure, power to summons. 
o Substantive legal training regarding a core set of fundamental rights 
which village courts would be required to respect. 
o Arbitration technique. 
 Raise the jurisdictional limit on the value of village court cases, so as to avoid 
the present trend of higher-value cases landing in the less formal shalish. 
 Review the effectiveness of enforcement procedure.  At a minimum, train UP 
members in the use of this procedure. 
 Establish proactive judicial supervision of village courts, for compliance with 
fundamental rights and with procedural requirements. 
 Either commit additional civil servant hours to provide administrative 
assistance to village courts, or allow UPs to arrange for such assistance 
according to their priorities and resources. 
Strengthening ADR and 
legal aid. 
 Expand the scope of NGO-reformed shalish. 
 Ensure the independence of legal aid efforts which aim to hold the state 
accountable. 
 Legal aid organizations should support village courts and monitor them for 
compliance with fundamental rights and with procedural fairness.  In the 
event of an unjust or illegal decision, a legal aid organization could assist a 
party to lodge an appeal.  
 Legal aid organizations should avoid breaches of judicial process, e.g. 
accepting as a fresh complaint an appeal from a village court decision. 
 Legal aid organizations should extend their accountability efforts to local 
government, assisting citizens to take action in response to corruption, abuse 
of authority, and failures in service delivery at the UP level. 
Evidence-based policy 
making. 
 Engage in more sophisticated quantitative and qualitative research into the 
demand for justice and the impact of the various justice institutions on the 
lives of Bangladeshis, and employ this information in the design of policy. 
 
 27 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has documented the nature of disputes as they emerge through survey data and the 
case files of NGO reformed shalish.  It has also analyzed based on qualitative data, the ways in 
which the shalish helps and hinders local justice.  Further, it has documented the evolution of 
local justice systems as a dynamic force, changing to keep pace with new socio-political realities.  
It has gone on to aid the understanding of more formal institutional mechanisms of local dispute 
resolution, particularly the village courts. 
 
In Bangladesh as in many other societies, dispute resolution is one of the core needs of especially 
the poor, who cannot access formal courts.  Old elites in the country are transforming themselves 
and new elites are gaining ground.  This is tied up to new structures and processes of decision-
making at the local level, of which local justice is a part.  Therefore, reform of the local justice 
system is intrinsic to the enhancement of equity and inclusion, within the context of broader local 
governance reform. 
 
Turning from empirical description to normative policy reflection, we suggest a number of 
opportunities for strengthening local justice.  The village courts may pose a useful bridge 
between Bangladesh‘s informal and formal justice institutions.  International experience on such 
intermediate institutions is mixed: they have succeeded in some cases, as with lay justices of the 
peace in Peru, and failed in others, as with nyaya panchayats in India. 
 
To improve the fairness of village courts, reformers could consider provisions to check the 
authority of the UP chairperson, like recusal rules, publicity requirements, and the right of parties 
to strike a panelist.  Asking the village courts to apply the general body of substantive formal law 
may be unrealistic and unwise.  But fairness may be served by specifying a core set of 
fundamental rights to which village court decisions would be required to comply. 
 
To improve the effectiveness of village courts, reformers could consider greater training for UP 
members, an increase in the jurisdictional limit on village court cases, a streamlining of the 
process for enforcing decisions, a system for proactive judicial supervision of the courts‘ 
compliance with fundamental rights and with village court procedure, and the provision of 
administrative assistance for the running of the courts. 
 
Civil society efforts in legal aid and alternative dispute resolution will remain crucial.  Civil 
society may consider expanding, and better coordinating, the provision of NGO-facilitated 
shalish as well as support for and monitoring of village courts.  Legal aid NGOs may also 
consider increasing their efforts to ensure state accountability at the local level.  NGOs can 
employ legal action as well as broader advocacy to respond to corruption, abuse of authority, or 
failures in service delivery by the Union Parishads. 
 
A truly informed strategy for strengthening local justice will require sophisticated quantitative 
and qualitative research into the demand for justice and the impact of the various justice 
institutions on the lives of Bangladeshis.  And translating such information into action would 
depend on greater strategic coordination among branches of government and among civil society 
organizations. 
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We argue that movements for rule of law and for decentralization offer an opportunity to focus 
new energy and resources on improving justice at a local level.  With open dialogue, careful 
analysis, and common will, government and civil society may be able to improve the 
fundamental fairness of Bangladeshi society.  
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Annex 1 
 
The World Bank Gender Norms Survey (WBGNS) 2006 is the first comprehensive nationally 
representative survey of gender norms and practices in Bangladesh that has both men and women in its 
sample.  It asks the respondents questions on marriage, norms and attitudes.  It is based on a sample of 
5,000 adults that include 1,500 married women each in the 15-25 and 45-59 year age range, 1,500 married 
male heads of households men in the 25-50 year age range, and 500 community leaders (such as Union 
Parishad (UP) members, Imams/Moulvis (religious leaders), primary school teachers and Madrasah 
teachers).   The samples were drawn in two stages. 91 clusters
18
 were selected at the first stage as a 
subsample of the 361 clusters included in the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) of 
2004. The second sampling stage selected one adult from each household. Opinion leaders were selected 
from among those who were resident in and around the cluster, having knowledge of and influences on 
the people of the cluster. On average 49 adults and 5-6 opinion leaders were interviewed in each cluster. 
Out of the 49 adults interviewed in a cluster, roughly 16 were married women age 15-25, 16 married 
women age 45-59 and 17 married men age 25-50. Interviews were conducted in April-May 2006. 
 
 
  
                                                 
18
 A cluster is a census defined village that corresponds roughly to a mouza village in rural areas and a census block 
(part of a mohollah) in an urban area 
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Who is more likely to have heard of conflict and violence in the community? 
 
 
Men & women 
coef sd 
Urban area (dummy) 0.425*** 0.074 
Completed primary  (dummy) 0.068 0.091 
Completed secondary/tertiary  (dummy) 0.181* 0.099 
Watch TV everyday/almost everyday   (dummy) 0.117 0.084 
Listen to radio everyday/almost everyday  (dummy) 0.372*** 0.090 
Household owns agricultural land (dummy) 0.052 0.076 
Assets: 2-nd quintile (dummy: poorest as ref) 0.268** 0.117 
Assets: 3-rd quintile  (dummy: poorest as ref) 0.205* 0.120 
Assets: 4-th quintile  (dummy: poorest as ref) 0.100 0.127 
Assets: 5-th quintile  (dummy: poorest as ref) 0.104 0.141 
Muslim  (dummy) 0.027 0.124 
Division: Barisal  (dummy: Dhaka as ref) -0.233 0.158 
Division: Chittagong  (dummy: Dhaka as ref) 0.561*** 0.100 
Division: Khulna  (dummy: Dhaka as ref) 0.592*** 0.109 
Division: Rajshahi  (dummy: Dhaka as ref) -0.017 0.095 
Division: Sylhet  (dummy: Dhaka as ref) -0.462*** 0.172 
Younger Women (15-25) (dummy) 0.114 0.083 
Older Women (45-59) (dummy) 0.052 0.092 
_cons -1.811*** 0.167 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;  
 
Logistic regression modeling the probability of having heard of conflict and violence in the community in the last year  
Dependent Variable:  1 if anyone‘s‘ money was taken away or if anyone was assaulted outside the home or women encountered 
harassment while traveling or people were physically hurt for political reasons 
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Illustrative Non-Government Initiatives Providing Legal Aid And Better Access To Justice 
 
Bangladesh Legal Aid and 
Services Trust (BLAST) 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) 
Nagorik Uddayong (NU) 
Madaripur Legal Aid 
Association (MLAA) 
Legal Services 
Provided  
Litigation (legal aid) and 
alternative mediation, training to 
women mediators or Shalishkars 
and training also to several 
levels of decision-makers and 
citizens 
Alternative mediation and legal aid 
through partner agencies – Ain-O-Shalish 
Kendro and BNWLA – legal aid cells and 
training to several levels 
Alternative Shalish and legal aid.  
Comprised of a cross-section of 
society with one third of the 
Shalish members being women, 
especially poor women. 
Legal Aid and Alternative 
Shalish 
Volume of Legal 
Service Provision 
8,867 complaints  received from 
April 2003 to March 2004  
30,125 complaints received in 34 districts 
across Bangladesh by December 2004 
896 Applications received from 
July 2002 to June 2003. 
579 legal aid cases filed in the 
fiscal year 2004-2005. 
Combined with the pending 
cases of the last fiscal year, the 
total number of cases is 1,442. 
A total of 10,138 alternative 
Shalish cases received in 2004-
2005 fiscal year 
Types of Cases 
Received 
74% of the 2,364 mediation 
cases  involved family matters 
77% of complaints  filed by 
women  
79% of the 4,042 cases filed in 
court represented female clients. 
79% of the cases received up to February 
2005 concerned marital conflicts.  
Primarily dealing with dowry, dower and 
maintenance, polygamy, divorce, hila 
marriage, physical torture, land related 
matters, money related matters, rape, acid 
throwing, kidnapping, trafficking, and 
fraud. 
Family violence, family matters, 
maintenance, polygamy, dowry, 
land related, loan repayment, 
minor issues and arguments that 
turn violence, and breaking 
informal contracts. 
Family related, divorce, 
maintenance, dowry, land 
ownership disputes. 
How the NGOs deal 
with complaints 
Processed either through 
mediation or as a second choice 
through the filing of a court case. 
If arbitration fails or if the matter is too 
serious a violation of human rights for 
arbitration, such as rape or acid attacks, 
ASK selects panel lawyers to take the 
case to formal court and oversee the work 
of BRAC staff members on the cases. 
BRAC group members can seek free 
advice from the panel lawyers, the 
lawyer‘s fees are covered by BRAC. 
Where dispute resolution 
through the Shalish is not 
possible NU provides legal aid 
to those in need and cases 
proceed to formal court. 
Out of the total of 275 cases 
that have been resolved, 163 
were resolved by the Court, 
and 111 were resolved locally. 
68 cases have been 
registered/documented. 936 
cases were pending in the 
2004-2005 fiscal year. 
Follow-up Work 
BLAST keeps records of its 
cases and follows up on cases 
after a settlement has been 
reached. 
BRAC staff required to follow-up on 
every case six months after the settlement 
or mediation agreement was reached. 
NU keeps records of all Shalish 
complaints.  
A Legal Aid Committee 
monitors all Shalish decisions in 
the locality every three months 
to assess the successes and areas 
for improvement for NU 
programs. 
The project has followed up on 
all resolved and pending cases 
to check if the verdicts are 
implemented in the grassroots 
and how the plaintiff‘s social, 
family and economic life is 
affected afterwards. 
Source:  Hassan 2006 (some figures from MLAA have been updated in the main body of the paper) 
